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1. Introduction
It is increasingly clear that gender equality varies conceptually from one country 
to another, as shown by indicators developed in the 1990s by several international 
organizations. The UNDP Human Development Report, for example, introduced two 
indicators in 1995: the Gender-related Development Index (GDI) and the Gender 
Empowerment Measure (GEM), both of which demonstrate that women’s basic 
capabilities and the extent of their participation in political and economic 
decision-making processes are highly variable.1
While these and similar indicators are based on macro indices, some studies focus 
on the gender equality perceptions of individuals. The literature shows that attitudes
toward gender equality are affected by respondents’ own backgrounds, such as marital 
status and educational attainment, and that the effects can differ from one country to 
another.2 This research allows policy makers to differentiate groups and thereby to 
consider what kinds of policies can have what kinds of impacts on whose gender 
perceptions. The main difficulty with these types of studies is that they require large
amounts of survey data on people’s perception.
Using data from a recently conducted value survey, the present paper looks at the 
gender perception of people in four Southeast Asian countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and the Philippines. The main objective is to determine which 
socio-demographic factors have significant impacts on people’s attitudes toward gender 
issues in this historically and culturally diverse region. As is described in detail below, 
the analysis shows that Muslim identity tends to be associated with acceptance of male 
authority.
It may seem a foregone conclusion that Muslims hold more conservative ideas
about gender equality than others, given that Islamic countries are commonly regarded
as having female-subordinating societies.3 The present paper, however, does not stop 
                                                  
1 While UNDP (1995) derived one crucial conclusion that “no society treats its women as well as its 
men” (p. 75), it also shows the variety by country and/or by region of gender issues. Human Development 
Reports after 1995 continue to list updated GDI and GEM figures.
2 See Davis and Robinson (1991) for example.
3 For example, Fish (2002) compares Muslim countries and Catholic countries in terms of literacy gap 
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here, but goes on to shed light on the diversity of attitudes toward gender equality even 
among Muslim people. It is regrettable that so few studies have attempted to 
differentiate Muslim populations into subgroups with distinct characteristics and to
investigate the impacts of different factors on perceptions of gender equality. Muslims 
have diverse opinions on gender equality for at least two reasons: First, quite simply, 
Muslims are diverse. The more than 1.5 billion in the world who are Muslim constitute
many national, ethnic, and socio-demographically different peoples.4 Some live in 
Muslim-dominant countries while others do not; some are urbanized while others are
rural. Consequently it would be both inappropriate and inaccurate simply to assume 
without examining the data that Muslims around the world share one uniform concept 
of gender equality.
Second, as mentioned above, attitudes toward gender equality can be affected by 
such factors as educational level and marital status. Although most previous studies of
this topic have focused on non-Muslim societies, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that 
the findings of those surveys are also applicable, at least in part, to Muslim societies.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the data used in the 
analysis. Each of the four surveys was conducted in a different manner due to the 
different conditions in the four countries, a situation which poses certain constraints on 
the analysis. The third section describes the methodology used and the results of a
“first-step” analysis demonstrating that peoples’ perceptions on gender issues can vary
across groups with diverse backgrounds. The fourth section, based on the result of the 
preceding analysis, explores the gender perceptions of Muslims. The objective of this 
section is to establish that ideas and attitudes on gender equality vary among Muslims, 
depending on socio-demographic background. The final section summarizes the
findings.
2. Data
Attitude surveys were conducted in 2010 in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and 
the Philippines by JICA Research Institute. An essentially similar questionnaire with 
more than one hundred questions was used covering respondents’ perceptions of 
religion, globalization and democracy as well as gender equality.5  Table 1 shows the 
                                                                                                                                                    
between the sexes, percentage of women in national government, and GEM, and to show that Muslim 
countries are more female-subordinating.
4 Recent Muslim population data can be obtained from the Pew Research Center (2009).
5 Questionnaires are slightly different in the four countries since some questions are applied to specific 
political or cultural conditions.
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Indonesia Malaysia Thailand Philippines
2250 1640 3044 1200
(nation-wide)
2007 Muslims
243 non-Muslims
(nation-wide)
1157 Muslims
483 non-Muslims
1409 in Bangkok
811 in Proximal prov.
824 in Patani region
600 in Metro Manila
600 in ARMM
Period January 2010 May 2010 May 2010 February 2010
Sample Size
basic information in the datasets.
Table 1: Sample size and survey period of the four surveys
Though the questionnaires were essentially the same, the method for conducting 
the surveys was different between the two Muslim-majority countries (Indonesia and 
Malaysia) and the two Muslim-minority countries (the Philippines and Thailand). In the 
former, the surveys were nation-wide. Samples were chosen from all the districts, and
the total number of respondents and the percentage of Muslim respondents from each 
district are proportional to the number and distribution of the population across the 
nation and in the districts. In the latter two countries, specific districts were selected so 
that Muslim majority areas and Muslim minority areas could be compared, and surveys 
were not conducted elsewhere in the countries. In the Philippines, the National Capital 
Region (NCR), or Metro Manila, was chosen as the Muslim minority region, and the 
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), the representative area with a 
majority Muslim population. In Thailand, three regions were selected: Bangkok as the
Muslim minority region, the “Patani region” composed of three Southern border 
provinces (Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat) as a Muslim majority conflict-prone region, 
and “Proximal provinces” (Songkhla and Satun neighboring the Southern provinces) as 
a Muslim majority non-conflict region. The numbers of Muslim and non-Muslim 
samples are largely the same in each region. The different sampling methods were 
adopted because the purpose of the surveys is not a cross-county comparison but a 
comparison of Muslim and non-Muslim populations in each country. 
The following statements on the questionnaires were used to measure respondent 
attitudes toward gender equality:
a) It is proper for men to assert their authority over women.
b) Women’s social positions should be equal to those of men.
c) Men and women should have equal rights.
d) Men and women should be educated equally.
e) Women should not work outside the home after marriage.
Respondents were asked whether they “strongly agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” or 
4
“strongly disagree” to these statements. Answers from each respondent were converted 
into scores 1 to 4. For statements a) and e), the “strongly agree” response scores 1, 
“agree” 2, “disagree” 3, and “strongly disagree” 4. For the other statements, the scoring 
is reversed. Since these statements can carry different nuances or values across 
countries, this paper uses each of the five statements separately as a dependent 
variable instead of constructing one synthetic variable (by, for example, computing first 
principle component). The higher the score, the more favorable the respondent is to the 
idea of gender equality.
3. Analysis of the impact of socio-demographic factors on gender perceptions
According to the existing literature, people’s perceptions of the gender issue are
affected by socio-demographic factors or circumstances. The present analysis first 
examines whether this finding is applicable to the four Southeast Asian countries, and if 
so, which are the factors that have significant impact. The independent variables here 
are sex, educational level, residential area (urban/rural), age, household income, marital 
status, and religion.
It is straightforward to expect women to have less supportive attitudes toward 
gender inequality than men. The so-called “underdog theorem” states that a group 
which is discriminated against or subordinated tends to be aware of the gap and to 
support efforts to eliminate it.6 It is, therefore, anticipated that the difference between 
the sexes has a significant impact on people’s gender perception in these four countries.
The impact of education, however, can be rather more complex. Education may
enlighten people about the problems of inequality and make them receptive to the 
possibility of reducing the gender gap. On the other hand, it may also be that education 
reproduces inequality. According to Kane (1995), education “may actually legitimate 
rather than challenge inequality” by emphasizing the importance of individual talent or 
effort in social accomplishment. When this happens, education can have a negative 
impact on gender-equality perception. In this paper, educational attainment is 
categorized into five and treated as an independent variable. The five categories are: no 
formal education, primary school completed, secondary school completed, high school 
or other vocational training school completed, and university degree and above.
Urbanization is another explanatory variable. Urbanized people generally have 
more opportunity to interact with people from different backgrounds; thus they tend 
more to endorse the idea of equal treatment among them, including equal treatment of
                                                  
6 Davis and Robinson (1991) survey this and other theorems and hypotheses.
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men and women. A binary dummy was created so that the analysis can distinguish 
respondents who live in urban areas from those who live in rural ones.
The generation gap is also an explanatory variable. Elderly people may have more
conservative attitudes about gender than the young. In the present analysis, respondents 
are divided into five age groups: 18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60 and above.
The impact of household income on gender perception is difficult to define.
Nonetheless, this factor very possibly does have an impact since low-income 
households may be more dependent on women’s earnings. In the present analysis, 
respondents in each country are divided into four categories according to their level of 
household income.
Marital status can also have an effect on gender perception, but probably in a 
more complex way. Since the impact of marital status can differ between the sexes, our 
analysis divides married respondents into males and females.
The last factor dealt with here is religion: Muslim or non-Muslim. There are two 
reasons for the particular focus on Islam. First, as is mentioned above, Islamic countries 
are generally considered to have patriarchal societies. It is expected, therefore, that 
being a Muslim already has a significant impact on gender perception. Second, Islam is 
one of the most remarkable and outstanding identities in Southeast Asia. It is estimated 
that approximately two hundred and fifty million Muslims inhabit this region, some
sixteen percent of the total world Muslim population.7 Given the prominence of Islamic 
influence and culture, it is worthwhile to understand its impact on people’s attitudes
toward the gender issue.
In this paper, the Mann-Whitney U test and the Kruskal-Wallis test are conducted 
to determine whether each socio-demographic factors makes a difference in people’s 
perceptions of gender equality, which is measured by the ordinary scale. Analyses of 
Indonesia and Malaysia are conducted nationwide; those of Thailand and the 
Philippines, by region. The tests compare several sub-groups’ mean ranks – for example, 
male’s mean rank of response to statement a) and female’s mean rank for the same 
statement – to see if the difference between the two mean ranks is significant. If it is 
significant, this means that the factor – in the example above, sex – has a significant 
impact on gender perceptions (either positive or negative). For the independent 
variables (such as educational attainment, household income and age) respondents are 
divided into more than two groups. As a result, even if the tests reveal statistically 
significant differences among groups, this does not necessarily mean that the impact on 
gender perception is linear. It is also possible that people come to have a more 
                                                  
7 Pew Research Center (2009).
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supportive attitude to gender equality after they have gone to primary school, but have 
again a less positive attitude after graduating from university.
Table 2 shows the results.8 Though they vary from country to country and from 
statement to statement, several interesting commonalities can be noted.
Table 2: Impact of Socio-Demographic Factors on Gender Perceptions
Statements a, b, c, d and e in this table correspond with statements on page 3
+/-: significant positive/negative impact (p < .01)
statement a b c d e a b c d e ±: significant non-linear impact (p < .01)
Female + (+) + + + + + + +, - or ± in parentheses means significant impact (p < .1)
Muslim - - (-) - - - -
Urban + (+) + "female": female, male
Married (-) (+) (+) (+) "Muslim": Muslim, non-Muslim
MarriedM (+) + "urban": living in urban area, living in rural area (for Indonesia and Malaysia only)
MarriedF (-) (-) "married": married, not married
Education + + + + - (±) + "marriedM": married male, non-married male
Income + + + - (-) (±) "marriedF": married female, non-married female
Age ± (+) (±) ± (±) "education": no education, primary, secondary, high-school, university and above
"income": respondents' household income divided into four categories
"age": 18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60 and above
statement a b c d e a b c d e The sample size slightly varies due to the number of respondents who answered "don't 
Female + + + + + + + + know" or didn't answer. However, basically it is close to the total sample size below;
Muslim (-) (-) - - - - - (-) Indonesia: total 2250, female 1125, male 1125
Married (-) - - - (-) (-) + + + (-) Malaysia: total 1640, female 816, male 824
MarriedM - - - - (+) - + + + (-) Philippines: total 1200, total in NCR 600 (female 299, male 301),
MarriedF - - - - + (+) total in ARMM 600 (female 300, male 300)
Education ± ± ± ± ± ± ± ± ± Thailand: total 3044, total in Bangkok 1409 (female 742, male 667),
Income ± ± ± ± ± ± (±) ± total in Proximal 811 (female 414, male 397),
Age ± - - ± ± ± ± ± ± ± total in Deep South 824 (female 427, male 397),
statement a b c d e a b c d e a b c d e
Female - + + + (+) + + +
Muslim - - - - - - (-) - - - - -
Married (-) (-)
MarriedM (-) (+)
MarriedF (-) (-) (-) (-) -
Education + (±) ± + ± (±) ± + (±) (±)
Income (±) - ± ± ± (+) + ± ± (±) ± ±
Age - (±) (±) (±) (±) ± (±) (±)
Thailand_Bangkok Thailand_Proximal Thailand_Deep_South
Indonesia Malaysia
Philippines_NCR Philippines_ARMM
The “underdog theorem” proves largely true in all four countries. Women are 
more supportive of the idea of gender equality, except for the residents of Bangkok.9
Due to the nature of the samples, the urban-rural distinction is irrelevant for 
Thailand and the Philippines. Observed from the Indonesian and Malaysian samples, 
however, it seems that this factor has only a limited impact on people’s gender 
perceptions.
The analysis of marital status yields an interesting result. Although the frequency 
of significant impact is not high – except in the Philippines where marital status seems 
to be influential – the tendencies in the other three countries are clear: married men tend 
to be more supportive of gender equality than non-married men, while married women 
are less supportive than non-married women. One explanation is that married men 
become more aware of women’s conditions and eventually come to support the concept
                                                  
8 As described in the data section, the numbers of Muslim respondents and non-Muslim respondents in 
each region in the Philippines and Thailand are the same. Muslim samples and non-Muslims samples in 
each region are “weighted” by the population share in each region.
9 The reason for this unexpected result is not immediately clear.
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of reducing gender inequality. Another possible explanation is that non-married women 
are likely to work outside the home and be exposed to situations of severe 
gender-inequality, which would naturally produce a more supportive attitude toward 
gender equality.10 What is intriguing is the way in which marital status affects gender 
perceptions in different regions (rather than between the two sexes) in the Philippines. 
Further study is necessary to explore reasons for this phenomenon.
The analysis of educational levels, household income, and age suggest several 
notable points. First, the impacts of these variables vary from one country to another. 
For example, household income has a significant positive impact in Indonesia, but a
rather negative impact in Malaysia. Another example is education. In Malaysia, unlike 
in the other three countries, it tends to reproduce the inequality perception. Educated 
Malaysians tend to disagree with the statement “women’s social position should be 
equal to that of men.”
Second, the impacts of these variables on gender perceptions are not linear. For 
instance, except for Indonesia, where education has a persistently positive impact, the 
effects of educational attainment are complex and non-linear. It is impossible, therefore, 
to naively conclude that education has a straightforwardly positive or negative impact 
on gender perceptions.
These cross-country differences probably reflect divergent historical and cultural 
backgrounds, which is something worth exploring in future studies.
Apart from the highly positive impact of “being female,” religion is the only 
factor that has a persistent impact across the four countries. In all four countries, 
Muslims have a significantly less favorable attitude toward the idea of gender equality
than do non-Muslims. This outcome is unsurprising, since Islam emphasizes male 
authority.
However, we should not stop our exploration here; we need now to study how 
religion intersects with other factors and also how it affects the gender perceptions of 
different groups of Muslims. This may eventually disprove the stereotypical image of 
patriarchal Muslims.
4. Analysis of Muslim perceptions of gender equality
In exploring the impact of Islam, several independent variables are added to the 
ones used in the previous section. One of these is “religiosity,” measured by how 
                                                  
10 Davis and Robinson (1991) describe this hypothesis well. They also explore spouse employment status 
in addition to marital status.
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devoutly each Muslim respondent observes the following religious activities:
1) prays five times a day
2) fasts in the month of Ramadan
3) conducts non-obligatory prayers
4) attends communal prayers
5) attends religious activities, such as sermons or religious discussions
Respondents were asked if they “never,” “seldom,” “often,” or “routinely” engage 
in these activities.11 These questions were then converted into numerical scores from 1 
to 4, so that the more religious people get the higher scores. Then the first principal 
component for these five factors was computed.12 Samples were then divided into two 
groups so they can be analyzed by the Man-Whitney U test: a respondent is “more 
religious” if his/her first principal component score is higher than the mean, and “less 
religious” if it is lower.
Respondents’ residential areas are also incorporated into the scope of this analysis. 
As mentioned in the data section, the surveys were conducted in specific regions in 
Thailand and the Philippines. In the present analysis, the samples are sub-divided by 
regions to clarify differences between Muslims living in the capital cities and those
living in Muslim-majority areas (ARMM in the Philippines and Patani region and 
Proximal provinces in Thailand). For Malaysia, respondents in Borneo (Sabah and 
Sarawak districts) are differentiated to see if Muslims in this area perceive the issue of 
gender equality differently, since the area is not only physically distant from the Malay 
Peninsula, but also has a different historical background.
Again, we use the Mann-Whitney U test as well as the Kruskal-Wallis test. This 
time, however, male and female samples are treated separately to control for sex, since, 
as shown in the previous section, this factor persistently affects gender perceptions.
Table 3 shows the result of these tests. As in the case of Table 2, Table 3 shows
whether the difference in the mean ranks is statistically significant between the 
sub-groups of Muslim populations, divided according to influencing factors.
Several interesting results are revealed. First and foremost, it is clear that Muslims 
from diverse backgrounds can have highly divergent attitudes toward gender equality.
All the factors tested here have an impact on Muslim gender perceptions in at least one 
of the four countries. Muslims have diverse ideas about gender equality, just as 
                                                  
11 These questions were asked only of Muslim respondents.
12 For the Thai and Filipino cases, the first principal component is extracted for each regional sub-group. 
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non-Muslims do.
Second, the way these factors affect gender perception varies from country to 
country. For example, age has a significant impact in Indonesia, where a male’s attitude 
toward statements a) and b), and a female’s attitude toward statements a), b), and e),
show significant variation according to generation, while this is not shown in the 
Philippines. Another example is education, which seems to have a complex and
non-linear impact in Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, while its impact is mostly 
positive in Indonesia.
Religiosity also intricately influences people’s gender perceptions, working
differently in the four countries. In the Philippines, it has a positive impact on people’s 
gender perceptions, while in Thailand its influence tends to be negative. This result 
simply suggests that it is naïve to assume that pious Muslims as a whole have negative 
attitudes toward gender equality.
It should be noted also that even within the same country, the impact of 
socio-demographic factors on gender perception can vary according to region. In 
Malaysia, Muslims living in Borneo show a more positive attitude toward gender 
equality compared with those living in the rest of the country.
In Thailand and the Philippines, as well, results differ depending on where the
respondent lives. Marital status, for instance, impacts gender perception more 
negatively among Muslims living in NCR than among Muslims living in ARMM. The 
same trend is observed among married female Muslims living in the Thai provinces 
neighboring the conflict region. Education, age and religiosity, however, seem to have 
greater impacts in the capital city than in other regions. While little divergence is 
observed among various socio-demographic subgroups in the conflict-prone provinces 
of Thailand, Muslims in Muslim-minority Bangkok show a grater range of gender 
perceptions across different social-demographic groups.
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Table 3: Impacts of Socio-Demographic Factors on Muslims' Gender Perceptions
Statements a, b, c, d and e in this table correspond with statements on page 3
statement
male/female M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F +/-: significant positive/negative impact (p < .01)
Education + + (±) (±) + + + + (±) ± ± ± (±) + ±: significant non-linear impact (p < .01)
Urban + + (+) (+) +, - or ± in parentheses means significant impact (p < .1)
Age (±) (±) + (±) ± (±)
Income + + (±) (±) (±) + (+) + (-) (±) + "religiosity": more religious than avarage, less religious than average
Married (-) (-) (+) "Borneo": living in Borneo, living in other part of Malaysia
Religiosity (+) (-) (-) (-)
Borneo (-) (+) + + + (+) + Sample size
Indonesia:
Muslim 2007 (female 1005, male 1002), non-Muslim 243 (female 120, male 123)
statement Malaysia:
area Muslim 1157 (female 574, male 583), non-Muslim 483 (female 242, male 241)
male/female M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F Philippines:
Education (±) (±) (±) NCR Muslim 300 (female 149, male 151), NCR non-Muslim 300 (female 150, male 150)
Age ARMM Muslim 300 (female 150, male 150), ARMM non-Muslim 300 (female 150, male 150)
Income (±) (±) (±) Thailand:
Married (-) (-) (+) (-) Bangkok Muslim 706 (female 369, male 337), Bangkok non-Muslim 703 (female 373, male 330),
Religiosity (-) (+) + (+) + + (-) Proximal Muslim 410 (female 211, male 199), Proximal non-Muslim 401 (female 203, male 198),
Deep south Muslim 420 (female 217, male 203), Deep south non-Muslim 404 (female 210, male 194),
statement
area
male/female M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F
Education (±) (±) (±) (±) (+) ± ± (+)
Age (±) + (±) (±)
Income (±) (±) (±) (+) (±)
Married - (+) - + (-) + - (-) (-)
Religiosity (-) (-) + - (-) - (-) -
Proximal D_SouthBangkok Proximal D_South Bangkok Proximal D_SouthProximal D_South
Notes:
BangkokBangkok Proximal D_South Bangkok
NCR ARMM
Thailand
a b c d e
NCR ARMM NCR ARMMNCR ARMM NCR ARMM
d e
Philippines
a b c d e
Indonesia Malaysia
a b c d e a b c
Finally, Table 4 shows the result of an analysis similar to that in Table 3, but of
non-Muslim respondents in each country. A comparison of the two tables demonstrates
that impacts of socio-demographic factors on gender perceptions differ between 
Muslims and non-Muslims.13
Table 4: Impact of Socio-Demographic Factors on non-Muslims' Gender 
Perceptions
statement
male/female M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F
Education (+) (±) (±) + +
Urban (-) (-) (-) (-) (+)
Age (-) (±) (±)
Income (±) (+) + (+) (±) (+)
Married (-) +
Borneo + + +
statement
area
male/female M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F
Education (±) (±) (±) (±) ± (±) (±)
Age (±) (-) - (±) (±)
Income (±) (+)
Married (-) (-)
statement
area
male/female M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F
Education (+) + (±) (±) (±) ± (+) + (±) (±)
Age (±) (±) (±)
Income (±) ± ± (±) ± ± (±) ± ± (±) (±) (±)
Married (+)
Indonesia Malaysia
a b c d e a b c d e
Philippines
a b c d e
NCR ARMMNCR ARMM NCR ARMM NCR ARMM
Thailand
a b c d e
NCR ARMM
Bangkok Proximal D_South Bangkok Proximal D_South Bangkok Proximal Bangkok Proximal D_SouthD_South Bangkok Proximal D_South
For example, a generation gap does not seem to exist among Muslims in the 
Philippines, while it does exist among non-Muslims in the same country. Education has 
                                                  
13 Since the sample size of non-Muslims is very small in Indonesia and Malaysia, the results in Table 4 
for these two countries may be irrelevant.
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greater impact on non-Muslims than on Muslims, although the impact is complex and 
non-linear for both groups. In Thailand, marital status counts more for Muslims than for 
non-Muslims.
Conclusion
Analysis of causality is beyond the scope of this paper. We cannot show how each 
socio-demographic factor affects gender perceptions in these four countries. It is 
impossible to explain with certainty, for example, why education affects people’s gender 
perception positively in Indonesia but adversely in Malaysia.
Nevertheless, the present paper shows that socio-demographic factors do work on 
the gender perceptions of Southeast Asian people, including Muslims.
In addition, people’s attitudes toward gender equality can vary across countries, 
probably reflecting different historical and cultural contexts.
Religion (having Muslim identity) and sex are the sole factors that have persistent 
impacts across the four countries. Muslims have a significantly less favorable attitude 
toward the concept of gender equality. Although this may sound natural, given the 
standard characterization of Islamic countries as patriarchal, further exploration reveals
that Muslims from different socio-demographic backgrounds have quite varied attitudes
toward gender equality. This finding warns against an unquestioned assumption that 
Muslims in Southeast Asia uniformly view gender equality negatively. Further study is
needed to clarify how religious and non-religious factors intersect to affect the Muslim 
view of gender.
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